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Abstract—The existing research on security issues in cognitive
radio networks mainly focuses on attack and defense in individual
network layers. However, the attackers do not necessarily restrict
themselves within the boundaries of network layers. In this paper,
we design cross-layer attack strategies that can largely increase
the attackers’ power or reducing their risk of being detected. As
a case study, we investigate the coordinated report-false-sensing-
data attack (PHY layer) and small-back-off-window attack (MAC
layer). Furthermore, we propose a trust-based cross-layer defense
framework that relies on abnormal detection in individual layers
and cross-layer trust fusion. Simulation results demonstrate that
the proposed defense framework can significantly reduce the
maximum damage caused by attackers.
Keywords: Cross-Layer Trust, Cognitive Radios, Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cross-layer design, a concept introduced to increase net-
work efficiency through information exchange among dif-
ferent layers, has brought revolutionary view change to the
networking research community in the past. Nowadays, the
increasingly ubiquitous and distributed networking systems
are facing brutal and intelligent attacks that exploit almost
all network protocols and surely do not restrict themselves
within the boundaries of network layers. Attackers have the
capability to launch attacks in multiple layers simultaneously
[1], [2]. Smart attackers can coordinate the attack activities
in different layers to better achieve their goals. The capability
of attackers is even strengthened by cognitive radio [3], [4]
technology, which makes network protocols more dynamic,
adaptive and programmable.
A cognitive radio device can dynamically program its
transmission parameters according to the surrounding wireless
channel conditions. As a result, it can make use of the
under-utilized frequency bands and mitigate the increasing
demand for spectrum resources. Meanwhile, it also brings
new vulnerabilities. In the physical (PHY) layer, there are
primary user emulation attack [5] and reporting false sensing
data attack [6], [7]. In the MAC layer, there are small-back-
off-window attack [8], reporting false selection frame [9],
and common control channel denial-of-service attacks [9].
Furthermore, many higher layer attacks against traditional
wireless networks can also apply to cognitive radio networks.
In current literature, the effectiveness of these attacks and
their defense methods are mostly studied independently. How-
ever, a smart attacker can launch several attacks in different
layers coordinately, which is referred as the cross-layer attack
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in this paper. Can attackers significantly increase the damage
or reduce the risk of being detected by launching the cross-
layer attacker? What are the effective defense strategies?
In this paper, we gain insights for answering the above
questions by investigating a cross-layer attack in cognitive
radio networks. We choose the reporting false sensing data
attack [6], [7] in PHY layer and the small-back-off-window
attack in MAC layer [8]. The goal of the attack is to reduce
channel utilization. Particularly, we
• propose a cross-layer defense architecture, which relies
on trust evaluation in individual layers and trust fusion
across multiple-layers;
• modify/develop anomaly detection in individual layers;
• design trust fusion algorithm that considers the diverse
performance of anomaly detection in different layers;
• demonstrate the significant increase of the attackers’
power due to cross-layer attack strategies, as well as the
effectiveness of cross-layer defense in terms of reducing
maximum damage caused by attackers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
summarizes the related works and background. Section III
describes the details of single layer attacks and the defense
in individual layers, the cross-layer attack strategy, and the
cross-layer defense architecture. Simulation results are shown
in Section IV and conclusion is drawn in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The proposed cross-layer defense architecture is applicable
to any distributed networking systems, in which coordinated
attack activities can occur simultaneously in multiple layers.
In this paper, we study PHY layer and MAC layer in cognitive
radio networks to demonstrate the proposed ideas.
PHY Layer Attack In cognitive radio network, secondary
users (without license) are allowed to access the licensed
spectrum if primary users (having license) are not present.
To protect the priority of primary users, secondary users must
quit the spectrum when primary users emerge. Therefore, sec-
ondary users need to carry out spectrum sensing to detect the
existence of primary users. In PHY layer, there are two types
of attack against spectrum sensing: Primary User Emulation
attack (PUE) [5] and Reporting False Sensing Data Attack
(RFSD) [6], [7]. In this work, we choose RFSD attack in the
PHY layer to demonstrate cross-layer attack/defense strategies.
RFSD attack targets collaborative spectrum sensing, in which
the final spectrum sensing results are based on the sensing
reports from multiple secondary users [10]. In RFSD attack,
malicious users mislead the final sensing results by sending
false sensing reports, which may result in inefficient usage of
spectrum resource or interference to primary user.
MAC Layer Attack Some MAC layer protocols [11] adopt
a spectrum access scheme similar to IEEE 802.11 DCF, the
CSMA/CA protocol. That is, in sensing period secondary users
scan channels and get the availability information. In transmis-
sion period they back off a random time and then select some
channels to transmit. If there is a collision, they will double
the backoff window size and retransmit. However, a greedy
node can use a small backoff window and gain priority on
channel access over other nodes [8], referred to as the small-
back-off-window (SBW) attack in this paper. Although there
are many other attacks in the MAC layer [9], we choose SBW
attack to demonstrate cross-layer attack/defense strategies.
Attack/Defense in Multiple Layers The study on handling
simultaneous attacks in multiple layers is rare. One such work
is cross-layer intrusion detection [1], which examines features
from multiple layers but does not consider the correlation
between attacks in different layers. It will be difficult for them
to capture the attacks that introduce minor misbehavior in
individual layers but cause big overall damage. Not to mention
the difficulty of obtaining training data for cross-layer attacks.
III. CROSS-LAYER ATTACK & DEFENSE IN COGNITIVE
RADIO NETWORKS
A. Cross-layer Attack Strategies and Defense Overview
We argue that the coordination of attack activities in
multiple layers can (1) reduce the attacker’s probability of
being detected, (2) reduce the cost to conduct the attack
successfully and/or (3) achieve the attack goals that may
not be feasible through attack activities in a single layer.
For effective coordination, the attacker should have a clearly
defined goal, which determines how the attack activities in
different layers are jointly organized or even optimized. We
propose a definition of cross-layer attack as
A cross-layer attack is a collection of attack activities that
are conducted coordinately in multiple network layers in order
to achieve specific attack goals.
In cognitive radio networks, we identify two representative
cross-layer attacks, which have not been reported in the current
literature.
Attack A1 Attackers can reduce channel utilization by
• making honest secondary users wrongly believe the ex-
istence of primary user when the primary user is absent,
through PUE attack, RFSD attack, etc, in PHY layer;
• reducing the probability of honest secondary users utiliz-
ing the channel in MAC layer, through common control
channel denial-of-service attack, SBW attack, etc.
These attacks have an “OR” relationship. That is, one attack
alone can achieve the attack goal (i.e. reducing channel uti-
lization). In this case, the attacker can simply use these attacks
alternatively in the time domain, such that the probability of
being detected in individual layers is greatly reduced.
Attack A2 If the cognitive radio nodes near the primary
user transmit data while the primary user is on, they cause
interference to the primary user. To achieve this attack goal,
two conditions need to be satisfied. First, the cognitive radio
nodes fail to detect the existence of the primary user, which
can be done through the RFSD attack. Second, they have data
to transmit. This can be achieved through attacking routing
protocols in the network layer. In particular, malicious nodes
can route the packets toward the secondary users who are
close to the primary user. Although this type of attack in the
network layer has not been reported in current literature, its
feasibility is obvious. In this case, the attack in physical layer
and network layer have an “AND” relationship, That is, one
attack activity alone cannot achieve the attack goal effectively.
These attacks should be conducted simultaneously.
To address the cross-layer attacks, the defense solution
should be effective such that the attackers cannot benefit from
the coordination among attack activities in different layers, and
compatible with the existing layered network organization. To
satisfy these requirements, one effective way is to introduce
“a common language” that can describe and integrate defense
in different layers. We choose trust as this common language
and build cross-layer trust framework.
In this paper, we will demonstrate the proposed framework
in the circumstance that the attackers conduct cross-layer
attack A1 with RFSD in PHY layer and SBW in MAC layer.
In the rest of this section, we will introduce how to evaluate
the trustworthiness of secondary users in PHY layer (Section
III-B) and MAC layer (Section III-C), describe cross-layer
attack A1 (Section III-D), and present the cross-layer defense
framework (Section III-E).
B. PHY Layer Attack and Defense
PHY Layer Attack Model As discussed in Section II,
malicious users can report false sending data to the common
receive (i.e. fusion center) such that they can mislead the
results of collaborative spectrum sensing. For example, an
attacker can report high energy level when the actual sensed
energy is low. If the fusion result by the common receiver is
on (primary user is present), the attack is successful.
Before demonstrating the RFSD attack model, we review
the characteristics of sensing reports from honest secondary
users. Let Ei denote the sensing energy for the ith cognitive
user in each sensing period, the distribution of Ei [10] is ,
Ei ∼
{
χ22m, H0,
χ22m(2γi), H1.
(1)
where χ stands for chi-square distribution, m is time-
bandwidth product, γi is the received signal to noise ratio
(SNR) for node i, and H0 (H1) means primary user is absent
(present).
For RFSD attack, we consider the always-yes attack strategy
proposed in [7]. When the malicious node senses energy level
Em, it will honestly report Em if Em ≥ ξ and dishonestly
report Em + ∆ if Em < ξ, where ξ is the attack threshold
and ∆ is the bias introduced by the attacker. In this attack,
malicious users report higher energy level when it estimates
that the primary user is not present. Let G0 denote honest
f0(xi) =



U [0, 32], w.p. 1− pc
U [0, 32] + U [0, 64], w.p. pc(1− pc)
U [0, 32] + U [0, 64] + U [0, 128], w.p. p2c(1− pc)
U [0, 32] + U [0, 64] + U [0, 128] + U [0, 256], w.p. p3c(1− pc)
U [0, 32] + U [0, 64] + U [0, 128] + U [0, 256] + U [0, 512], w.p. p4c(1− pc)
U [0, 32] + U [0, 64] + U [0, 128] + U [0, 256] + U [0, 512] + ∑nci=5 U [0, 1024], w.p. pncc (1− pc)
(2)
reporting and G1 denote dishonest reporting. The probability
density function of Ei with attackers becomes,
Ei ∼



χ22m, G0,H0,
χ22m(
2∆
σ2 ), G1,H0,
χ22m(2γi), G0,H1,
χ22m(2γi), G1,H1.
(3)
where σ2 is noise power.
PHY Layer Defense Scheme Currently there are some
defense methods that address the RFSD attack [6], [7]. The
scheme in [6] can only apply to hard fusion case, i.e.,
secondary users reporting binary detection results to the fusion
center. A defense scheme that deals with soft fusion, i.e,
the reporting value is sensed energy level, is proposed in
[7]. In this scheme, suspicious level of each secondary user
is calculated based on its reporting history. Inspired by this
scheme, we develop a scheme that has lower computation
complexity and is easier to fit into the cross-layer defense
architecture.
The proposed scheme is composed of three steps. In the
first step, for each node j, the common receiver conducts
hypothesis test 1 to detect the presence of the primary user us-
ing sensing reports from other secondary users. The Neyman-
Pearson lemma can be written as
N∏
i=1,i6=j
P (Ei = ei|H1)
P (Ei = ei|H0)
H1
>
<
H0
η , (4)
where η is the detection threshold for hypothesis test 1 and N
is the number of secondary users.
In the second step, hypothesis test 2 is performed to check
whether a secondary user (e.g. j) is lying or not. From (3),
we can see that attackers will not lie under H1. So we
only perform hypothesis test 2 when the detection result of
hypothesis test 1 is H0. Hypothesis test 2 is given by
P (Ej = ej |G1,H0)
P (Ej = ej |G0,H0)
G1
>
<
G0
ζ , (5)
where ζ is the detection threshold for hypothesis test 2.
Through hypothesis test 2 we have the binary opinion about
whether a node is lying or not in each sensing period. In the
third step, if we observe that a node has reported r honest
reports and s dishonest reports in the past, by the beta function
trust model [12] we calculate the PHY layer trust value of the
node as,
π1 =
r + 1
r + s + 2
. (6)
If π1 is below threshold λ1, the node is detected as mali-
cious.
C. MAC Layer Attack and Defense
MAC Layer Attack Model As mentioned in Section II, some
MAC layer protocols in cognitive radio networks are similar
to IEEE 802.11 DCF protocol. When the channel becomes
idle for a time equal to a distributed interframe space (DIFS),
secondary users that have packets to send start to transmit. If
the channel is sensed busy during the DIFS period, the nodes
should defer their transmission by a random backoff time.
The random backoff time is uniformly distributed between
[0, CW ], where CW is current contention window. For the
first backoff, CW is set to CWmin. After each unsuccessful
transmission (collision or packet lost), the value of CW is
doubled until it reaches CWmax. It will be reset to CWmin
after a successful transmission. For a typical IEEE 802.11
DCF protocol, CWmin is 32 and CWmax is 1024. In SBW
attack, malicious nodes use a small CW value to gain channel
access priority over other nodes. Attacks can be conducted
with different intensity. For example, an aggressive attacker
can set CWmin = CWmax = 2 and a moderate attacker can
set CWmin = 16, CWmax = 512. In this paper we set CWmin
= CWmax = 8 for attackers.
MAC Layer Defense Scheme To defend against the SBW
attack, we develop a defense method based on the scheme in
[8], which checks whether the observed backoff window size
distribution follows the real distribution. In [8], Kolmogoriv-
Smirnov (K-S) test is used to compute the difference between
distributions. However, as K-S test only considers the maxi-
mum value of the CDF difference, it is known to be sensitive
near the center of the distribution. To improve the scheme in
[8], we replace the K-S test by a modified Cramer-von Mises
(C-M) test [13]. The proposed scheme is described as follows.
First, the backoff window size of each node is observed.
For the RTS/CTS access in 802.11 DCF protocol, all nodes
within the range of the observed node can have the knowledge
about: the end time of last transmission ti−1, current time of
RTS packet ti, and the time elapsed (TO) between ti−1 and
ti when there is a collision or other nodes are transmitting.
Then the backoff window size can be calculated as [8],
xi =
ti − ti−1 − TDIFS − TO
δ
, (7)
where is TDIFS is the length of DIFS frame and δ is the time
unit of backoff window. With the observed backoff window
size, we can obtain the empirical distribution of backoff
window size and its cumulative distribution F1 .
For a typical IEEE 802.11 DCF with CWmin = 32 and
CWmax = 1024, the backoff window size distribution of
normal nodes f0 is given in Eq. (2) [8], where U is uniform
distribution and pc is collision probability which can be
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Fig. 1. Cross-Layer Defense Framework
estimated by the observation of successful transmission count
and collision count. Then we can obtain the CDF F0.
If we have K observations x1, ..., xK and L sample data
y1, ..., yL generated from real distribution, we can conduct the
C-M test as,
θ =
KL
(K + L)2
( K∑
i=1
[F0(xi)− F1(xi)]2 +
L∑
j=1
[F0(yj)− F1(yj)]2
)
. (8)
Note that in (8), it only measures the absolute difference be-
tween the two distributions, which cannot distinguish whether
the observed CDF F1 is above the real CDF F0 or under F0.
For the case that F1 is mostly under F0, which means the
observed backoff window size is greater than normal size, the
node should not be classified as misbehaving. To take this case
into consideration, we modify the C-M test to,
θ =
KL
(K + L)2
( K∑
i=1
sgn(F0(xi)− F1(xi))[F0(xi)− F1(xi)]2
+
L∑
j=1
sgn(F0(yj)− F1(yj))[F0(yj)− F1(yj)]2
)
, (9)
where sgn(x) is sign function.
Define D = max{θ, 0}, we calculate trust value of MAC
layer as,
π2 = e−D
2
. (10)
When θ is negative, (i.e. the area of F1 is mostly under
that of F0), D is 0, and trust value π2 is 1. It indicates that
the node is completely trusted. Otherwise, when θ is positive
(i.e. the backoff window size is smaller than normal value),
π2 decreases as the distribution difference increases. If π2 is
below threshold λ2, the node is detected as a malicious node.
D. Cross-Layer Attack
In this paper, we investigate the cross-layer attack strategy
A1 described in Section III-A. In particular, malicious users
choose to conduct RFSD attack with probability P1 in each re-
porting round in the PHY layer, and conduct SBW attack with
probability P2 after a successful transmission or collision in
the MAC layer. Here, P1 and P2 are called attack probability
in PHY and MAC layer, respectively.
Because of the defense schemes described in Section III-B
and III-C, the aggressive attackers, who attack all the time,
can be easily detected. Smart attackers should behave well and
badly alternatively, and carefully choose the attack probabili-
ties. As we will demonstrate in Section IV, there exists optimal
Fig. 2. Multipath Trust Value Combing
attack probabilities such that attackers can cause maximum
damage without being detected. The performance of the single
layer defense, cross-layer attack, and cross-layer defense will
be evaluated in the worst- or best-case scenario in which the
attackers choose the optimal attack probabilities.
E. Cross-Layer Defense
To address the cross-layer attack in wireless networks, we
propose a cross-layer defense framework shown in Fig. 1. The
framework has the following components:
• Single Layer Monitoring & Trust Calculation (SLMTC):
collecting observations from network protocols, and eval-
uating in-layer trust values (e.g. π1 and π2).
• Trust Fusion: taking in-layer trust values as inputs and
calculating an overall trust value T for each node.
• Abnormal Detection: identifying malicious nodes based
on the overall trust values and how they change with time.
The SLMTC schemes have been discussed in Section III.B
and III.C. In this subsection, we will describe trust fusion and
abnormal detection, which are jointly referred to as the cross-
layer trust manager (CTM). Trust fusion can be modeled as a
multipath trust propagation problem shown in Fig. 2, in which
PHY layer trusts node i with level π1, MAC layer trusts node
i with level π2, and the cross-layer trust manager (CTM) trusts
the PHY layer results with level w1 and the MAC layer results
with level w2. The goal is to determine how much CTM should
trust node i, which is just the total trust value T .
For the multipath combining, we adopt the method in [14],
T = w1π1 + w2π2, (11)
where w1 and w2 are the weights, and π1 and π2 are in-layer
trust values calculated in Section III-B and III-C.
We argue that w1 and w2 should describe the effectiveness
of in-layer trust values in terms of differentiating good nodes
and bad nodes. When the variance of honest nodes’ in-
layer trust values is large, it is more difficult to separate the
malicious nodes and the honest nodes with low trust. Denote
by v1 the variance of π1 and v2 the variance of π2. We define
w1 =
v2
v1 + v2
, w2 =
v1
v1 + v2
. (12)
We use a heuristic method to calculate vj , j = 1, 2. Denote
vij the variance of the sequence {πij(1)...πij(M)}, where i is
node ID, j is layer ID, and M is current detection round. Let
vmj be the median of {vij , 1 6 i 6 N}. The variance value vj
is calculated as
vj =
1
Cj
∑
i,∀1≤i≤N & v
i
j
vm
j
6ρ
vij , (13)
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where ρ is a threshold to filter out variance values that are far
away from normal variance values and Cj is the number of
nodes whose trust variance satisfies
vij
vmj
6 ρ. The reason for
adding this filter is to make sure that the calculation in (13)
is based on trust variance from honest nodes.
With Eq. (11) - (13), we can obtain an overall trust value
T for each node. If the overall trust value of a node is below
threshold λ3, the node is detected as malicious. Then actions
can be taken in the PHY layer and MAC layer such that it
cannot cause further damage.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Simulation Setup
We consider a cognitive radio network of N (=10) secondary
users and two of them are malicious. We assume the attackers
do not collude.
For PHY layer simulation, the time-bandwidth product m
is 5. Primary transmission power is 200mw and noise level
is -110dBm. Path loss factor is 3. For the RFSD attack, the
attack threshold ξ is 15 and attack bias ∆ 15. The threshold
in hypothesis test 1 is set to η = 1 and that in hypothesis test
2 is set to ζ = 1.6.
In MAC layer, for honest users, the minimum backoff
window is 32 and maximum is 1024. Attackers use a fixed
backoff window with size 8. The length of observed data K is
15 and that of sample data L is 1000. We simulate the scenario
that the secondary users are saturating, i.e., they always have
packets to send. For the case that some cognitive radio nodes
are not saturating, for example, the nodes will wait a certain
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time for new packets after a successful transmission, their
observed backoff window CDF F1 will be absolutely under
F0, then they will still be classified as legitimate terminals.
For fair comparison, in all defense schemes, the trust
value threshold is set such that the false alarm rate Pf of
malicious user detection is 0.001. Specifically, for single layer
attack/defense in Section IV-B, the PHY layer trust threshold
λ1 is set to 0.8 and MAC layer trust threshold λ2 is set to 0.4.
For cross-layer attack/defense in Section IV-D, trust threshold
λ3 is set to 0.75. For cross-layer attack single layer defense
in Section IV-C, λ1 is 0.79 and λ2 is 0.36. The threshold ρ in
Section III-E is 10.
B. Results for Single Layer Attack & Defense
We study the attack/defense in PHY layer as described in
Section III-B. The results are shown in Fig. 3. In this figure, the
x-axis is attack probability and y-axis is channel availability
defined as the probability that the primary user detection result
is idle when real channel status is idle. When attack probability
is 0 (no attacker), channel availability is near 1 (considering
possible false alarm made by honest nodes).
Fig. 4 shows the results for MAC layer attack/defense
discussed in Section III-C. The x-axis is attack probability
and y-axis is average transmission probability of honest user.
Note that the sum of transmission probability of all users is
less than 1 due to the existence of collision.
Three curves are compared for single layer attack/defense:
(1) N (=10) secondary users, two of them are attackers, no de-
fense; (2) N (=10) secondary users, two of them are attackers,
single layer defense; (3) N (=8) secondary users, no attackers.
From these two figures we make following observation,
• When there is no defense, the channel availability in
PHY layer (or transmission probability in MAC layer)
decreases significantly as the attack probability increases.
• The performance in PHY layer is more sensitive to the
increasing of attack probability than that in MAC layer.
• With PHY layer defense, the channel availability de-
creases first and then starts to increase and finally con-
verges to the case that all remaining nodes are honest. As
shown in Table 1, the optimal attack probability is 0.15
and the maximum performance degradation is 11.73%.
• Similarly, with MAC layer defense, the optimal attack
probability is 0.6 and the maximum performance degra-
dation is 5.84%.
Table 1 Maximum performance degradation (Pf = 0.001)
Damage Optimal P1 Optimal P2
PHY attack/defense 11.73% 0.15 N/A
MAC attack/defense 5.84% N/A 0.6
CASD 17.40% 0.15 0.6
CACD 9.73% 0 0.65
C. Cross-Layer Attack v.s. Single Layer Defense (CASD)
The results for cross-layer attack v.s. single layer defense
is shown in Fig. 5. Here, the attack goes cross-layer but the
defense is done independently in two layers. In this figure,
the x-axis is PHY layer attack probability, y-axis is MAC
layer attack probability, and z-axis is average transmission
probability of honest users.
An interesting observation is that the best performance
happens on the four corners of the figure, which indicates
either no attack or always attack. In CASD, when a user
is classified as malicious in one layer, the detection result
is sent to other layers such that the malicious user cannot
cause further damage in other layers. In this case, the optimal
attack probabilities are P1 = 0.15 and P2 = 0.6 , which means
conducting the optimal attack in two layers simultaneously.
The largest damage attackers can cause is 17.4%. That is,
malicious users can bring down the performance by 17.4%
without being detected.
D. Cross-Layer Attack v.s. Cross-Layer Defense (CACD)
Fig. 6 shows the average transmission probability of honest
users when the proposed cross-layer defense is used to handle
the cross-layer attack. The x-axis is P1 and the y-axis is
P2. Compared with the results of CASD (see Fig. 5), we
can see that the average transmission rate achieves its best
performance (i.e. as if there are no attackers) in much more
area. In terms of the worst-case performance, the maximum
performance degradation ratio is 9.73%, when the attackers
choose P1 = 0 and P2 = 0.65. The worst-cast performance
degradation of CACD is only 56% of that of CASD. Obvi-
ously, the proposed cross-layer defense scheme can effectively
handle cross-layer attacks.
The worst-case performances of all tested schemes are
summarized in Table 1. It is clearly seen that cross-layer
attack is stronger than attacks in single layers when there is
no coordination among defense schemes in different layers.
Furthermore, the proposed cross-layer trust framework can
defeat cross-layer attack effectively.
V. CONCLUSION
When the attackers start to coordinate their actions in
different layers, their attack strength is enhanced even if there
are abnormal detection mechanisms in each layer. In this paper,
we raised the concern about cross-layer attacks and utilized
cognitive radio networks as the platform to demonstrate such
attacks. A specific attack, time domain coordination of RFSD
and SBW, was studied in details. More importantly, we
designed a cross-layer trust defense scheme by developing
(1) abnormal detection schemes in PHY and MAC layers
and (2) the cross-layer trust manager. The proposed defense
demonstrated excellent performance against this cross-layer
attack. Finally, we would like to point out that the concept
of cross-layer attack and the proposed defense framework can
be applied to other attacks in cognitive radio networks, and to
other types of wireless networks.
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